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Observatorio de Política
Esta sección incluye artículos que discuten en forma rigurosa, 
pero no técnica, temas corrientes de política económica que son 
de interés por su vinculación al mundo real, aún cuando la literatura 
económica no los haya todavía incorporado defi nitivamente y ar-
tículos que presentan contenidos teóricos o resultados empíricos con 
implicancias de política relevantes. Esta sección procura acercar 
a los investigadores académicos con los formuladores de política 
aportando, respectivamente unos y otros, desarrollos teórico-con-
ceptuales y empíricos importantes y claridad e información sobre 
las prioridades de política. Los artículos enviados a para esta Sección 
no están sujetos a los procedimientos normales de referato de la 
Revista.
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Experts have been pointing out that, although fully funded pension 
schemes implemented by several Latin American countries gathered 
political rejection and experienced important setbacks, they were resorted 
to in response to the  problems faced in the eighties and the nineties by 
unfunded regimes. In this connection, the idea is that both individual 
capitalization and PAYG systems can and should coexist provided that 
effi cacy in ensuring  expected levels of coverage, equity and effi ciency 
and in guaranteeing also long run fi nancial sustainability be appropriately 
reached.Nevertheless, several preconditions appear necessary for the 
preceding scenario to be possible: coverage and tax compliance need 
to be expanded in both regimes particularly to include the self employed 
workers, individual capitalization needs be improved and turned more 
attractive by reducing administrative and commercial costs and by offering 
a more varied portfolio composition concerning instruments and risk 
levels. Finally, despite that competition between regimes, by permitting 
affi liates to switch from one to another, promotes effi ciency, non con-
tributory pensions will still be necessary, on grounds of distributional, 
solidarity and equity goals. 
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Diversos expertos señalaron que, aunque los esquemas jubilatorios de 
capitalización sufrieron rechazos políticos y experimentaron retrocesos 
y cambios en varios países latinoamericanos, la razón de su implemen-
tación se debió a los importantes problemas que se observaron en los 
ochenta y noventa con los sistemas jubilatorios basados en sistemas de 
reparto. En este sentido, existe la idea de que tanto la capitalización 
individual como los sistemas de reparto pueden y debieran coexistir siempre 
que se alcance efi cacia en asegurar niveles esperados de cobertura, equidad 
y efi ciencia y en garantizar también la sostenibilidad fi nanciera de lar-
go plazo. Sin embargo, el mencionado escenario hace necesario que se 
cumplan un conjunto de precondiciones: la cobertura y el cumplimiento 
tributario debe incrementarse en ambos sistemas incluyendo particular-
mente a los trabajadores independientes, la capitalización individual 
debe a su vez mejorarse y tornarse más atractiva vía la reducción de los 
costos administrativos y comerciales  y la oferta de una composición más 
variada de las carteras tanto en instrumentos como en niveles de riesgo.
Finalmente, no obstante que la competencia entre regímenes –al permitir 
que los afi liados circulen libremente de uno hacia el otro- promueve la 
efi ciencia, los sistemas no contributivos de jubilación  serán todavía nece-
sarios, en términos de objetivos distribucionales, de solidaridad y equidad.
Palabras clave: Capitalización Individual, Sistemas de Reparto, Sistemas No 
Contributivos, Cobertura, Cumplimiento Tributario, Sostenibilidad Financiera.
Clasifi cación JEL: H55
I. Iඇඍඋඈൽඎർඍංඈඇ
Theoretical frameworks based on the “life cycle hypothesis” were 
generally resorted to in order to analyze the impact of social security sys-
tems upon savings. The idea, originally due to Modigliani and Brumberg 
and later summarized and extended in the paper by Ando and Modigliani 
(1963), basically stated that an individual consumer᾽s utility was a function 
of his/her own aggregate consumption in current and future periods. As is to 
be expected, the approach acknowledged that individuals maximized con-
sumption subject to their budget constraint; that is, subject to their lifetime 
resources, which in turn summed current and discounted future earnings and 
current net worth. 
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The plain introduction of social security regimes1 within the ´life cycle 
hypothesis´ is expected to affect individual᾽s savings as the payment of ben-
efi ts needs social security taxes to be collected and this will immediately 
cause the current disposable income to shrink by the amount of the payroll 
tax; therefore, the idea of savings᾽ reduction taking place seems thus to rest 
on the following two accounts: the reduction of disposable income and the 
ultra rational idea that payroll taxes are perfectly substituting the impact of 
private saving fall upon future consumption.
Nevertheless, the implication that social security regimes always 
have a negative impact upon savings2 has not gone unchallenged in the re-
lated literature, as soon as one departs from the framework of analysis pro-
vided by simpler versions of the life cycle model. Feldstein [1974] himself 
quoted authors᾽ yielding empirical evidence on that people covered by fully 
funded regimes save even more than those uncovered individuals, based 
on a 'recognition effect'3 emerging when people entering a private pension 
plan perceive the benefi ts of saving for their old age (educational effect) and 
change their utility function, or a 'goal gradient hypothesis'4 whereby efforts 
are intensifi ed the closer people are to set goals. 
Blinder (1982) interestingly added to the theoretical discussion by 
raising the point that while expansions in private pensions, in the presence 
of capital market imperfections, would increase savings, social security 
systems of the PAYG system (based on the Modigliani-Miller Theorem) 
would likely not as savings in the latter case were solely aimed at fi nancing 
consumption on retirement for what, and with no borrowing restraints, while 
private (funded) pension plans could not have any effect upon savings, social 
security taxes in unfunded regimes would in fact reduce savings, as shown 
in quoted Feldstein᾽s developments. 
Let alone the raised controversy above the likely effects of funded or 
unfunded systems upon aggregate savings, the Latin American region expe-
rienced in the eighties and the nineties the widespread adoption of funded 
systems (individual capitalization accounts) for reasons other than an ex-
pected positive impact upon savings and more related at the time with the 
collapse of PAYG regimes due to public sector᾽s increasing defi cits and debt 
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1.  As will be shown, results more clearly depict the case of unfunded PAYG regimes. 
2. This assertion obviously depicts the case of unfunded PAYG systems.
3. First stated by Cagan (1965).
4. See Katona (1964), p. 4.
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accompanied by high infl ation levels and low working labour/retirees ratios, 
as developed in Section III below. Nevertheless, the initial optimism placed 
upon funded systems gradually turned into skepticism as soon as evidences 
showed that the performance of individual capitalization accounts yielded in 
practice results that fell short of people᾽s expectations, as shown in Section IV.
As the matter is of the outmost importance for the Region, this sur-
vey aims to contribute to the discussion of appropriate pension systems, for 
what the performance of both the PAYG and the Individual Capitalization 
Scheme is critically reviewed for eight developing and emerging countries: 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, México, Perú and Uruguay, in 
line with what Bertranou et al (2009) called the First Round of Reforms. 
This assessment purports not only to point out the regimes᾽ shortages and 
drawbacks but also to ascertain whether both can be jointly and advantageously 
used when optimizing the working of pension systems  is the upheld objective.
II. Tඁൾ Uඌൾ ඈൿ Dൾൿංඇൾൽ Bൾඇൾൿංඍ ൺඇൽ Dൾൿංඇൾൽ Cඈඇඍඋංൻඎඍංඈඇ 
Pൾඇඌංඈඇ Rൾ඀ංආൾඌ ൻඒ Sൾඅൾർඍൾൽ Lൺඍංඇ Aආൾඋංർൺඇ Cඈඎඇඍඋංൾඌ
 
As Boadway and Cuff (2005) pointed out, contributory pension 
schemes basically aim at ensuring –through some coercion- that income earn-
ers save out of their incomes, as the presumption exists that otherwise this 
may not happen voluntarily. In this regard, the implied government interven-
tion spreads over a range of matters such as regulation of alternative regimes, 
coverage, employees and employers᾽ contributions, legal requirements for ac-
ceding to benefi ts, pension payments᾽ form, public and private participation, 
composition of fund assets, schemes᾽ administrative arrangements and so on.
Needless to emphasize, a major feature that characterizes pension 
regimes is whether they are funded or unfunded. In the fi rst case, pension 
benefi ts are paid out of a fund, integrated with assets stemming from the 
accumulation of past or current contributions and whose size, determined 
on the basis of correct actuarial procedures5, should permit to meet future 
liabilities; unfunded regimes, such as PAYG, rely on the contrary on the ex-
plicit principle of intergenerational solidarity in so far as all active labour᾽s 
current contributions are devoted to fi nance benefi ts paid to individuals that, 
let alone compliance of legal requirements, have reached the retirement age. 
5.  Boadway and Cuff (2005, p. 101) pointed out the fact that actuarial fairness of fully funded 
regimes could refer to the accounts of each individual contributor but also to the regime as an 
aggregate but not for all persons.
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In either case, pension regimes may fall in the categories of de-
fi ned-contribution or defi ned-benefi t depending on whether workers are 
subject to predetermined contributions or benefi ts. A defi ned-contribution 
regime implies that workers periodically (monthly) pay a predetermined 
percentage of earnings and therefore their pension payments will result from 
the accumulated contributions plus the expected investment᾽s yield whereas 
in the second case they will accede –on retirement- to predetermined benefi t 
levels based on income earned during working life6. Let it be noticed that 
different risk levels are involved for the parties depending on the chosen 
variant; thus, individuals undertake more risk under defi ned-contribution as 
the size of their pension benefi ts will be highly related to the rate of return of 
accumulated contributions; contrariwise, pension benefi t providers (either 
public or private ones) are more exposed to risks in reason of the liability 
imposed upon them by the defi ned-benefi t system. A worth mentioning point 
refers to the impact of infl ationary risk that may hurt defi ned-benefi ts unless 
these are indexed and also individual accounts in defi ned-contribution plans 
that may have eroded their future values due to the negative impact of infl a-
tionary situations caused by government policies or any other cause.
Finally, defi ned-contribution or defi ned-benefi t systems resort to 
various forms of fi nancing the most common being employees or employ-
ers᾽ contribution or a combination of both which are normally levied as a 
fi xed percentage of wages. Nevertheless, and particularly in Latin American 
countries, pension systems are seen to permanently increase their depend-
ence on budgetary tax resources (mainly Value Added and Income Tax); 
the reasons for that should mainly be sought at the large share of informal 
labour as well as the marked contributors᾽ tax infi delity, particularly in the 
group of self employed workers. The need to resort to fi scal resources –other 
than payroll taxes- is also explained by important social policies of inclu-
sion and poverty checking whereby governments set transfer programmes 
for supporting the elderly with no incomes.
Apart from the characterization of the different pension systems, a 
far more important policy matter, with which a number of specialists have 
deal with7, refers to the economic effects of contributory pension regimes 
upon labour supply and demand, individual and aggregate savings and capital 
6.   There are several variants for computing the ratio of pension benefi ts to income earned: income of 
the last years before retirement, the highest earning years or a combination of both.
7.  See for instance Baillieu and Reisin (1997), Boadway and Cuff (2005), Faruqee and Husain 
(1994), Feldstein (1974), Raddatz and Schmukler (2008), Rezk et al. (2009).
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market furthering.8 In this connection, labour supply may dwindle due to 
payroll taxes and their negative impact on wage incomes unless, and as 
Boadway and Cuff (2005) pointed out, benefi ts are directly related to contri-
butions and these have an upper limit above which there is a nil marginal tax 
rate effect; a corollary of this is that while provident funds and pension plans 
are not expected to have an important effect upon labour supply, this con-
clusion is not straightaway applicable to public defi ned-benefi t regimes. The 
impact of pension regimes on retirement age is not a linear one: in particular, 
the possibility of early retirement pensions tends to shrink labour supply to 
the extent that the pension size proves to be higher than the opportunity cost 
of staying (i.e additional contributions); on the other side, the retirement age 
will not be affected should actuarially well designed regimes operate. Also, 
the idea prevails that human capital accumulation will unlikely be affected 
by payroll schemes but would be favoured by provident funds from which 
individuals could draw resources for fi nancing training. Finally, labour mo-
bility will not generally be prevented if public pensions (such as PAYG) and 
provident funds grant their benefi ts at an individual level. Although subjects 
such as workers᾽ mobility and cost of hiring somehow impact upon labour 
demand, the outstanding point here refers to employment effects of fully 
fl exible labour markets versus those in which wage rigidities are important, 
as in the fi rst case elasticities of demand and supply will determine how 
contributions will be absorbed both by employees and employers whereas if 
wage rigidities prevent shifting the tax burden to employees, employers may 
refrain from hiring additional labour.     
Latin American countries, based on the European tradition of unfunded 
schemes and defi ned-benefi ts, traditionally ran PAYG regimes; however, and 
for reasons to be mentioned in the next section, they started to explore differ-
ent alternatives in the last part of the 20 century and to experiencing advances 
as well as noticeable setbacks. In this connection, the ensuing Table 1 shows 
choices of eight selected Latin American emerging countries when resorting 
to one of the ensuing four variants for running their pension systems:
1. A Single System: In this case, affi liation is mandatory for all work-
ers and contributions are channeled to the PAYG regime or to 
individual capitalization accounts in order to be administered 
by private fi rms or public bodies (pension fund administrators). 
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8. The economic impact of funded and unfunded regimes upon individual and aggregate saving and 
the capital market is dealt with in the next section.
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2. Integrated Mixed System: PAYG and individual capitalization 
regimes coexist and workers᾽ contributions are distributed 
between both regimes as it is legally determined.
3. Mixed System in Competence: individual capitalization and PAYG 
compete for affi liations and contributions are totally directed 
to the regime chosen by employees.
4. Others: It refers to the case in which pillar 1 is mandatory and other 
options are open for pillar 2.
Argentina introduced in 1994 a mixed in competition system whereby 
labour and self employed workers could chose between the PAYG regime 
and individual capitalization accounts administered by private pension fund 
administrators. As of 2008, the system was suspended and the country returned 
to a single PAYG variant. Bolivia, for its part, somehow experienced a similar 
change the difference being that the mixed in competition scheme created in 
1997 evolved into a capitalization regime in which workers᾽ contributions 
started to be administered by a governmental body.
The mixed in competition regime (similar to those in Argentina and 
Bolivia) persists in Colombia and Peru whereas Uruguay adopted in 1995 a 
mixed integrated system whereby workers are compulsorily sent to the PAYG 
regime, if salaries do not exceed a fi xed legal fl oor and to the individual cap-
italization accounts when salaries range between minima and maxima salary 
incomes. Contributions corresponding to salaries exceeding the compulsory 
upper limit can be voluntarily sent to the capitalization regime.
Countries Year Single 
System
Mixed 
Integrated 
System
Mixed In 
Competition
Others
Argentina 1994                     x               
x
2008
Bolivia
1997                     
x
x
2010
Brazil 1991 x
Chile 1981 x
Colombia 1993 x
Mexico 1997 x
Peru 1993 x
Uruguay 1995 x
Table 1: Operating Pension Systems
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Finally Chile and Mexico, since 1981 and 1997 respectively, are the 
only two countries in the group that have a single mandatory system based 
on individual capitalization accounts.  
III. Wඁඒ Iඇൽංඏංൽඎൺඅ Cൺඉංඍൺඅංඓൺඍංඈඇ Aർർඈඎඇඍඌ ൻൾർൺආൾ ൺඇ ൺඅඍൾඋ-
ඇൺඍංඏൾ ඍඈ PAYG Rൾ඀ංආൾඌ ංඇ Lൺඍංඇ Aආൾඋංർൺ 9
As of the eighties and the nineties, in the 20 century, several Latin 
American countries began to assess the convenience of substituting existing 
PAYG earning related pension schemes (as it happened with Chile᾽s pioneering 
reforms) or adding (as in Argentina) privately managed fully funded pension 
systems –based on individual capitalization accounts- leaving however on 
contributors hands᾽ (labour and self employed workers) the decision over the 
preferred system.
In some cases, the switch took place all of a sudden following bank-
ruptcy situations faced by PAYG regimes, whose causes could be traced back 
to sharp infl ationary processes and economic and demographic unbalances 
dwindling to unbearable levels the workers/retirees ratio and increasing ex-
isting pension regimes᾽ defi cits; the massive incorporation of benefi ciaries 
(specially the self employed) through ad-hoc plans amounting to a bail out10 
and the channeling of pension resources to general fi scal revenues, in order 
to deal with the important defi cits originated by a growing public spending 
and the diffi culties in tax collection and budgetary fi nancing, must also be 
accounted for at the moment of explaining the crisis of unfunded pension 
schemes. 
It needs to be acknowledged also that a widespread fall in saving 
rates occurring by the time in many Latin American countries, must also be 
counted as an important motivation underlying substantial changes in pension 
systems, as the idea prevailed that the accumulation of pension fund assets 
would defi nitely encourage aggregate savings (Bailliu and Reisen, 1997) 
and contribute also to enlarge domestic capital stock markets (Reisen, 1997; 
Raddatz and Schmukler, 200811).
  
9.  Section III was taken from  Rezk, Irace and Ricca (2009).
10. Those programmes, known as “moratorias”, permitted contributors to enjoy the benefi ts after a 
limited number of years of contribution (smaller than the 35 legally required).
11. The paper by Raddatz and Schmukler is a particularly interesting one as the authors aim at shedding 
light on the very interesting debate of how pension funds affect capital markets´ development.
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The economic appeal that individual capitalization schemes had upon 
policy makers, specially for their assumedly expected positive impact upon 
saving rates, must however be revised in the light of the very often ambiguous 
results found in the literature devoted to the analysis of several countries᾽ recent 
experience. Thus, while some analysts of the micro and macroeconomic perfor-
mance of pension systems concluded that fully funded pension schemes defi nite-
ly contributed to enhancing private saving in countries like Chile and Singapore 
others found running counter evidences for Malaysia (see for instance Corsetti 
and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1996; Morandé, 1996; and Faruqee and Husain, 1994).
In the context of the American economy, Feldstein (1974) also analyzed 
the impact upon individuals᾽ decision on saving of introducing social security 
systems; by resorting to a life cycle model, his econometric estimations 
showed that social security funds depressed personal savings.12 Nevertheless, 
Feldstein also explored the implications of using an “extended life cycle 
model”, allowing people to continue working after the age of 65 and in which 
the net impact of social security regimes upon aggregate savings fell short of 
being unambiguous.
It is to be noticed that the existing theoretical controversy with regard 
to the real impact of individual capitalization upon saving rates and capital 
formation is related to the Life Cycle Model᾽s nature, whose conclusions sen-
sitively react to changes in assumptions held, but also to the type of pension 
system referred to. Bailliu and Reisen᾽s paper (1997) is in this regard worth 
mentioning as these authors also stressed the ambiguity of pension fund assets᾽ 
effect upon saving depending for instance on whether there were taxed returns or 
liquidity constraints, for what they concluded that the sign of the relation between 
pension fund assets and saving was fi nally a matter of empirical resolution.
In dealing with the matter, Boadway and Cuff (2005) refl ected the 
existing ambiguity in respect of the real effect of mandatory regimes upon 
aggregate saving, whose increase was deemed necessary to boost investment 
and, in turn, the growth rate. The analysis, built upon a dynamic version 
of the life-cycle model acknowledged in the fi rst place that the fi nancing 
form chosen for pensions could affect the saving rate either by affecting the 
average wealth of individuals in the pension regime or by respectively re-
distributing wealth among individuals in the same group (intra generational 
12. Mainly based on the rational of a PAYG system, the idea was that the need of counting with 
savings for future consumption was averted by retirees´ guaranteed benefi ts fi nanced through 
previously collected social security taxes.
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transfers) or between different age groups (intergenerational transfers). The 
conclusion was that a fully funded scheme would not induce changes in the 
saving rate (and in turn in aggregate saving) unless a very high contribution 
rate were resorted to whereas an unfunded pay as you go system would 
decrease aggregate savings.13 
The empirical treatment of the subject also posed interesting challenges, 
as shown by econometric attempts forced to dealing with the problem of a 
scarce number of degrees of freedom, this being explained by the relatively 
short existence of main fully funded pension regimes in the world and the 
consequent recourse to statistical series yielding information only for a lim-
ited number of periods. Grouping data for a set of countries and estimating 
coeffi cients by means of a fi xed effect panel data model, in order to refl ect 
included countries᾽ specifi cities, became therefore an alternative to sort out 
the mentioned diffi culty. 14
IV. Fൾൺඍඎඋൾඌ ൺඇൽ Pൾඋൿඈආൺඇർൾ ඈൿ Pඋංඏൺඍൾ Cൺඉංඍൺඅංඓൺඍංඈඇ Rൾ-
඀ංආൾඌ ංඇ ඍඁൾ ආൺංඇ Lൺඍංඇ Aආൾඋංർൺඇ Eආൾඋ඀ංඇ඀ Eർඈඇඈආංൾඌ
The review of fully funded pension regimes in all the eight countries 
chosen15, as well as the analysis of determined features regarding their 
investment portfolio structure and of some other related indicators intends 
to shed some light on individual capitalization᾽ performance in the Region 
following something more than two decades since it came into being.16 
A fi rst feature deserving a comment is the relative size and evolution of 
pension fund assets, in terms of gross domestic product. As Graph 1 depicts for 
the period 1996-2006, the increasing paths show also differences in magnitude 
once countries are individually considered; thus, while the ratio reached in 
Chile more than 50%, it only reached 10% in average for the rest of the 
countries by the end of the period. Two main reasons can be accounted for 
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13. The situation becomes more complex when one intends to assess the impact of pension regimes 
upon individual saving as the outcome may depend on the type of assumptions held. In this 
regard, individuals may naturally be low savers, wages may not be fl exible enough, individuals 
may be affected by the uncertainty of pension fund returns, individuals may save for reasons 
other than to smooth consumption, savings may be affected by pension plans that affect the 
decision to retire, etc. 
14.  See the empirical treatment due to Rezk et al. (2009).
15. Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay.
16.  Except for Chile, where the system dates from 1981.
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in explaining differences in percentages: in the fi rst place, individual capital-
ization started much earlier in Chile for what the regime exhibits more ma-
turity17; in the second place, individual capitalization was mandatory in Chile 
and Mexico whereas PAYG regimes in Argentina, Colombia and Peru have 
not been eliminated and competed with the former as people were allowed to 
choose. Uruguay presents in turn an interesting situation as inclusion in either 
of the two regimes depended on individuals᾽ scale of income or wages18.
Graph 2, that depicts the evolution of funds (in terms of gross do-
mestic products) beyond 2006 and up to 2012, permits to assert that pension 
funds kept increasing their participation with fi gures of 10% to almost 20% 
of product, with the exception of Chile that remained in 60%. Due to chang-
es in their pension systems in 2008 and 2010 respectively, Argentina19 and 
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17. Nevertheless, the assets´ yearly percentage growth is higher in the other fi ve countries as sugges-
ted by Bailliu and Reisin (op.cit. page 23) due to the fact that, by being more recent, they have 
greater contributors/retirees ratios.
18. People can however express their decision to be included in one of them.
19. As is publicly known the Argentine Congress, following a project received from the Executive 
Branch, enacted in November 2008 a law to stop the privately managed fully funded pension 
scheme based on individual capitalization. From that moment on, the ANSES (Social Security 
National Administration) already managing the PAYG regime, took over exclusive responsibility 
for the collection of all social security taxes and the payment of pension benefi ts and for the 
management of the Sustainability Guarantee Fund composed at the time of the assets of the 
former capitalization system.  
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Bolivia are not represented in the graph; Brazil is –as mentioned above- a 
particular case as individual capitalization operates at the second pillar and 
close funds range between 17% and 20% of the product.
The matter discussed above made reference to the impact of funded 
pension systems upon aggregate saving formation, in relation to what it was 
assumed that unfunded systems stemming from the theoretical framework 
of the Life-Cycle Model were not expected to increase but rather decrease 
it. With respect to this, the following graphical display helps to visualize 
whether individual capitalization regimes implemented since the eighties in 
Argentina, Chile, Colombia, México, Peru and Uruguay were conducive to 
increasing aggregate saving in the period 1996-200620.
Figures in Graph 3 show that pension fund assets clearly dragged 
aggregate savings in all the countries, the effect being more visible generally 
after the fi fth year of the regime implementation; Chile and Uruguay consti-
tuted the exception in so far as they seemed to reveal a negative relationship 
between both plots. Argentina was in particular a worth quoting case as 
aggregate private saving kept stable between 1997 and 2000 although gross 
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Graph 2
 Pension Fund Assets in Percentage of GDP
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20. Graphs were taken from Acuña (2013) and from Rezk et al (2009) who also backed the graphical 
analysis with an econometric estimation of a panel data model one of whose purposes was to 
gather evidence about the role of fully funded regimes in enhancing aggregate saving.
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Graph 3
Pension fund assets and aggregate private savings in percent of GDP, by country
domestic product shrank in these years as a consequence of an industrial reces-
sion lasting until 2001; it can be inferred therefore that the sustained growth 
shown by pension funds somehow helped to compensate a fall in private sav-
ings that would otherwise happened following the reduction of income.
As for the supposedly paradoxical Chilean case, the explanation can 
again be sought in that, due to the earlier regime implementation, the effect 
must have been stronger in the eighties when restrictions on foreign investment 
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21.While Fontaine (1996) recalled that until 1989 Chilean regulations banned any international di-
versifi cation of pension funds, Reisen (1997) in turn asserted that this restriction was crucial in 
explaining why the Chilean domestic capital market grew in size and depth despite an internal 
climate of debt crisis and uncertainty.
22 See National Legislation in the Appendix to this paper.
by the new pension funds existed.21 In short, the stagnation and consequent 
small fall in aggregate savings in percent of gross domestic product must be 
looked at in the light of the banning lift in foreign investment, which is in 
turn confi rmed by the diagram showing the latter᾽s incidence in portfolios.
In seeking next an explanation for the Uruguayan case, the saving 
plot᾽s pattern must somehow be refl ecting a feature of the implemented system 
which notwithstanding the fact that it is compulsory for certain wage earner 
groups, inclusion by default is based on the individuals᾽ income scale.
The variations and lack of similarities in portfolio structures, as 
shown by graphs 4 and 5 below, are the best examples of differences, in 
many cases signifi cant ones, that can be found in national legislation con-
cerning how pension fund assets can be invested. In particular, and even if 
it is taken for granted that public bonds will always be an important part of 
portfolios, countries often place a limit to their share in investment compo-
sition22. Despite this, countries have somehow managed to fi nd shortcuts to 
the mentioned limitations, as it was particularly noticeable in the case of 
Argentina, whose legislation banned pension funds to invest in public bonds 
beyond 50% of the whole portfolio. Fiscal matters and the restructuring of 
public debt must be borne in mind when the excessive government bonds᾽ 
participation in pension funds is analyzed in Argentina; in particular, severe 
credit restrictions preventing the access to foreign and domestic fi nancing led 
the authorities to resort to pension funds which became forced lenders.
Worth quoting changes are however revealed by Graph 4, when com-
paring the situation while Argentina had the funded regime (2007-2008) with 
the one in which PAYG was reinstated and the Sustainability Guarantee Fund 
managed (2012-2013). In the fi rst place, the section embodying investment 
in public bonds gradually increased up to 63% of total but the two following 
sections (corporate and fi nancial assets) shrank and investment in foreign 
bonds disappeared and other assets in turn reduced drastically its share 
within the portfolio. In change, the governmental body managing the Fund 
(ANSES) started to fi nance a number of public projects included under the 
label of "productive projects and infrastructure" whose participation reaches 
14% of the portfolio.
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As for the rest of countries (Graph 5), Chile and Peru exhibit public 
bonds᾽ lesser shares but while in the former the evolution shows a downturn 
trend there is a slight increase in participation in the latter country. The cases 
of Bolivia and Mexico are also noticeable in that public bonds participation 
in portfolios is practically overwhelming23; Uruguay, in turn, stabilized 
participations of public bonds in around 55% after experiencing shares as 
high as 90% in 2006 – 2007 whereas Colombia refl ects in turn the average 
situation of 45%-50%.
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Graph 4
Argentina: Former Private Funds Portfolio (2007-2008) 
and PAYG Sustainability Guarantee Fund (2011-2013)
Graph 5
Structure of Fund Portfolios 
in some Latin American Countries (2010) 
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23. Investment of Mexican pension funds in government bonds represented more than 90% in 1997, 
although they later stabilized in around 70%-80% for the rest of the period; the opposite took 
place in Uruguay as the initial participation rounding 60%-80% climbed to 80%-90% by the end 
of the considered period.
State Corporate Financial Foreign Ec. Proj. + Inf Liquid Assets
The participations of other portfolio components fell short of being 
stable, or similar among countries, throughout the period considered. In gen-
eral, there has been a tendency, on the part of pension funds and except for 
Uruguay, to increase investment in foreign assets shares although at a slow 
rhythm. Chile is however the worth stressing case here as, following the 
end of the initial banning over pension funds᾽ international diversifi cation of 
portfolios, foreign assets started to climb reaching to around 40% of all ap-
plications. Investment in foreign bonds is also important in Peruvian pension 
funds and of lesser relevance in Colombia and México.  
Financial investments by pension funds both exhibited an irregular 
performance among countries as well as a marked cyclical behavior in the 
period; except for the case of Chile where they have had a very stable share 
within the portfolio, with moderate variations within a 25%-30% interval, 
investment in fi nancial assets showed marked cyclical variations in several 
countries although their participation is still important in Argentina, Bolivia, 
Chile, Peru and Uruguay whereas their importance is minor in the cases of 
Colombia and Mexico. Similar conclusions can in general be drawn for the 
case of equities, although in this case Colombia and Peru were the only coun-
tries in which the latter᾽s participation kept stable around 35% total pension 
fund᾽s portfolios and they are also noticeable in Chile.
While fi gures in Table 2, column 3, replicate the situation already 
shown by the Graph 2 above, it is noticeable what the column 4 indicates 
with respect to pension assets᾽ real returns: in all cases, the average real re-
turn was positive and ranged between 6% and 10% per year. The Argentine 
case was also included in the table as, despite having stopped the individual 
capitalization regime in 2008, a Sustainability Guarantee Fund was creat-
ed to which funds of the former Pension Fund Private Administrators were 
channeled.
V. Iඌ ඍඁൾ Rൾ඀ංඈඇ ඇඈඐ ൾඑඉൾඋංൾඇർංඇ඀ ൺ ඌൾඍ ൻൺർ඄ ඍඈඐൺඋൽඌ Nඈඇ-
ൿඎඇൽൾൽ PAYG Rൾ඀ංආൾඌ?
As pointed out in Table 1, two countries (Argentina and Bolivia) re-
verted their systems from fully funded pension regimes to totally or partially 
PAYG systems in 2008 and 2010, respectively. Even the leading country, 
Chile, had a thorough revision in 2008 whereby a modifi cation of its pension 
regime took place and an unfunded non contributory system was introduced 
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Million dollars Share of GDP   Average Annual  
Real Returnc
Argentinaa 50,500 15.0% 9.4%
Brazilb 232,373 17.0% 
Bolivia 7,875 29.2% 5.8%
Chile 159,190 58.5% 8.7%
Colombia 71,205 18.8% 9.5%
Mexico 143,898 10,3%  6.9%
Peru 35,547 19.2% 8.1%
Uruguay 9,120 17.4% 9.0%
Table 2
Administered Pension Assets – Year 2012
a. 2013 fi gures are used for Argentina, corresponding to the Sustainability Guarantee Fund.
b. Brazilian fi gures are for 2007 and they correspond to closed  pension funds; open funds 
represented 3%-4% of GDP
c. As of the year each country started the regime.
fi nanced out of general revenues; the revision also stated that individual ca-
pitalization benefi ciaries would be supplemented had they not reached a mi-
nimum level for their retirement benefi ts. Furthermore, countries like Brazil 
or others, like Colombia and Peru in which individual capitalization schemes 
are a key component of the pension systems found necessary to implement 
non contributory pensions for individuals above 65 years with no incomes.
The response to the question posed by the headline to this section 
may not possible be straightforward, as distinct macro and microeconomic 
reasons such as sustainability and fairness might have been behind the chan-
ges; nevertheless, the information on coverage in the ensuing Tables 3 and 
4 offers clear hints for understanding why this is today still an important 
political concern in the region, let alone the socio economic implications.
The fi rst of two facts deserving being stressed in Table 3 is that only 
55% of workers in the region are in average actually contributing to any 
pension regime and that this percentage is not also even throughout coun-
tries analyzed as fi gures as low as 32% (for Bolivia) fi nd their counterpart 
in Uruguay with almost 85%. The second result is the striking evidence that, 
while the average for regional affi liation is substantially high regarding civil 
servants (90%), almost 40% of private labour and 90% of self employed 
workers are not included in any pension scheme. Needless to emphasize, the 
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explanation must be sought at the existence and size of the shadow economy 
and consequently of informal labour markets, which is particularly noticea-
ble in Bolivia, Mexico and Peru (for the case of private workers) and gene-
ralized to all countries with respect to self employed workers. Despite the 
pessimism transpired by fi gures in Tables 3 and 4, the last column of Table 3 
Total Civil Servants
Private 
Sector 
Workers
Self 
Employed 
Workers
Pension 
earners 
over 65
Argentina 68.7% 92.6% 77.2% 32.7% 90.7%
Bolivia 32.4% 74.6% 32.5% 2.1% 91.0%
Brazil 75.9% 93.6% 84.0% 24.3% 84.7%
Chile 81.7% 86.0% 86.5% 26.3% 84.2%
Colombia 57.2% 97.2% 77.2% 10.5% 44.0%
Mexico 41.3% 69.2% 59.3% … 44.0%
Peru 50.4% 89.0% 59.5% 14.0% 25.4%
Uruguay 84.7% 99.9% 91.5% 39.4% 85.6%
Latin America 55.4% 90.4% 65.5% 12.4%        %
Table 3
Employed Individuals, over 15, effectively contributing to PAYG 
or Individual Capitalization Regimes
Source: ECLAC fi gures for 2011,  Mexico 2010.
Table 4
Pension Funds´ gross and effective contributors - year 2010
Registered 
Contributing      Effectively
Argentinaa 10,972,000 40.9%
Brazil … …
Bolivia 515,159 39.3%
Chile 4,487,843 51.7%
Colombia 4,080,088 45.3%
Mexico 13,440,855 33.0%
Peru 1,923,466 42.4%
Uruguay 624,093 65.5%
a. Figures for Argentina correspond to 2008, as the regime was stopped that year.
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clearly shows that the performance in most of the selected countries is much 
better than in the regional level, situation explained by strong national social 
policies oriented to widening the coverage of the elderly (as is particularly 
the case of Argentina and its ample moratoria) or to enabling people over 65 
to accede to non contributive income (such as Dignity Rents in Bolivia, or 
pensions fi nanced out general revenues in Chile).24
The question as to why individual capitalization accounts did not be-
come the solution envisaged when the system was fi rst implemented, in the 
eighties in Chile, is somehow responded by fi gures of Table 4 that pointed out 
the marked discrepancy between those individuals registered and those effec-
tively complying with the payment of contributions; the compliance hardly 
reached the fi fty per cent of registered in fully funded regimes.25 Needless 
to say, this feature is basically related to the weakest tax compliance of affi -
liated self employed workers that, in many cases, carry out their economic 
activities in the informal sector.
The major role of, or reliance on, fully funded private systems has 
been challenged several times, let alone the most extreme Argentine and 
Bolivian cases. It has already been said that the leading country in this fi eld, 
Chile, underwent in 2008 a revision of its regime the result of which were 
some important modifi cations and the introduction of a non contributory re-
gime for the poor without income or pension coverage. The discussion seems 
not to be over in this country as the government recently initiated announced 
the setting up of a committee of national and international experts with the 
duty of assessing the system and proposing changes in the light of low pen-
sions earned by the retired.
In a very interesting article in which Bertranou et al. (2009) won-
dered whether Latin American countries were actually moving away from 
individual capitalization accounts these authors emphasized that fear of fi s-
cal unbalances and badly managed PAYG regimes counted at the outset for 
countries to resort to pensions based on capitalization but also pointed out 
that three main issues could not appropriately be dealt with by fully funded 
schemes; that is, a low level of coverage, the contraction of social nets and 
imperfections in regulatory frameworks.
24. Colombia, Mexico and Peru stand as an exception as they have lower coverage of the elderly.
25.  It is not uncommon that employees´ lack of compliance be in turn accompanied by tax evasion 
on the employers´ side.
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Graph 6
     Latin American Countries: Coverage rates previous to fully funded schemes 
(before) and in 2002 (after)
The authors᾽ fi rst assertion is clearly refl ected not only by fi gures in 
Table 4 but also but the bars of the ensuing Graph 6 in which coverage rates26 
for the seven countries27 are measured for two points in time: the moment 
before countries adopted a fully funded scheme (also called fi rst round of 
reforms) and the year 2002, depicted in the graph as after.
The underlying rationale behind what Bertranou et al. (2009) called 
the First Round of Reforms was the idea that defi ned contribution schemes 
were going to enhance not only the level of coverage, but also tax complian-
ce, based on the assumption that individuals would not only fi nd a stronger 
connection between contributions and benefi ts but also because they would 
regard contribution payments as savings instead of a tax; nevertheless, and 
supporting the evidence given by Table 4, the above Graph 6 clearly shows 
that the rate of coverage fell in all countries once fully funded schemes started 
to operate. The main reasons for this to happen were already mentioned; that 
26. For the purpose of the analysis, the coverage rate is defi ned as the quotient between contributors 
and economically active population.
27. Needless to say, Argentina is only represented by the ´ before´ bar as individual accounts were sto-
pped at 2008. Brazil is not represented either as PAYG is still the main pension system, although 
there is an important development of individual accounts at fi rms´ level (closed funds) and also 
some others run by state governments. 
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is, the structure of labour markets in which informality is by no means a minor 
feature28, apart from other features such as important unemployment levels. 
A second important reason explaining why fully funded regimes fell 
short of fulfi lling expectations was that, contrariwise to PAYG systems, they 
did not solve the problem of inter and intra generational solidarity for what 
public intervention had to be called upon in order to handle, via non contri-
butory regimes, the situation of the elder with no incomes.29
A third worth emphasizing matter was that, after an initial enthusiasm 
with fully funded schemes, a feeling of disappointment grew among retirees 
when they realized that the quantum of their benefi ts was by far much smaller 
than originally expected, as rates of return resulted negatively affected by the 
excessive burden of items such as fees, insurance premium and other costs 
detracted from their contributions. 
A last but by no means less important matter referred to imperfect re-
gulation, one of whose fl aws was a marked degree of weakness due to political 
interference with the investment decisions followed by funds. Argentina was 
a clear example in this matter, as pension administrators suffered, due to the 
government᾽s scanty access to international capital markets, an enormous pres-
sure to take public bonds, which ended in 2009 with the total asset seizure.30  
In sum, a fair and balanced answer to the question posed at the beginning 
of this section should be that many Latin American countries managed to legally 
enact –and operate- sophisticated fully funded pension regimes that not only re-
lieved governments in a moment of fi scally strained fi scal budgets but also served 
the purpose of enhancing aggregate saving and of furthering fi nancial markets.31 
Nevertheless, the experience of almost two decades of fully funded regimes clear-
ly showed that important changes were indispensable should countries intend to 
continue running pension systems based on individual capitalization accounts.
28. As expected, this is also a consequence of a stretching informal economy that prevails in many 
sectors of activity.
 29. After individual capitalization accounts were implemented, different countries (i.e. Bolivia, Chi-
le, Colombia) had to strengthen their social security nets with non contributory pensions.
30. The authorities blamed the world crisis of 2008 and 2009, as being responsible for the country´s 
fi scal problems and the transmission of their negative effects to the pension system.
31. It must also be pointed out that private pension schemes counted in general with approval within 
the countries where they were implemented. Argentina was a clear example of this: the gover-
nment did away with the regime in 2008 notwithstanding the fact that –the year before- the 
option of allowing those individuals in capitalization accounts to return to the PAYG systems was 
rejected by more than 80% of affi liates.
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VI. Cൺඇ Pൾඇඌංඈඇඌ᾽ Iඇൽංඏංൽඎൺඅ Aർർඈඎඇඍඌ ൺඇൽ PAYG උൾ඀ංආൾඌ 
ർඈൾඑංඌඍ ංඇ Lൺඍංඇ Aආൾඋංർൺඇ ൾආൾඋ඀ංඇ඀ ർඈඎඇඍඋංൾඌ?
Although many experts have pointed out that the use fully funded sche-
mes en Latin American countries gathered political rejection and experienced 
contraction, the prevailing idea is that fully funded and unfunded regimes can 
and should coexist for what, as Bertranou et al (2009) suggested, individual 
accounts should be improved  while accepting –at the same time- that PAYG 
and non contributory regimes may successfully accompany properly designed 
and run defi ned-contribution schemes as the former could have, at least in 
relation to solidarity, equity and distributional goals, a better performance.   
In this regard, and given that the quality of any pension regime, or 
combination of pension regimes, must be judged for the effi cacy in reaching 
expected levels of coverage, equity and effi ciency as well as for its success 
in guaranteeing long run fi nancial sustainability, social security economic 
policies to be drawn in the future  must necessary address a set of matters 
which, only for the sake of illustration are listed below:
1. Non contributory pensions are defi nitely necessary, on grounds of 
distributional, solidarity and equity goals and should work in 
connection with programmes seeking to check poverty and 
structural unemployment.
2. Coverage and tax compliance need to be expanded, both in fully 
funded and unfunded regimes, in special in the case of self 
employed workers as they prove to be the more reluctant 
group at the moment of meeting their fi scal (including social 
security) responsibilities.
3. Individual capitalization needs be improved and turned more at-
tractive in various ways that could infl uence pensions᾽ size 
at retirement, as for instance by reducing administrative and 
commercial costs for allowing rates of return to increase and 
by offering a more varied portfolio composition both in term 
of fi nancial instruments and levels of risk.
4. Competition between fully funded and unfunded regimes, by per-
mitting affi liates to switch from one system to another, could 
at the end be favourable in so far as this enhances overall 
effi ciency.
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5. Financial sustainability of PAYG regimes may be deepened by 
resorting to ad-hoc reserve funds whose resources are avai-
lable for stabilizing pension outlays in the event of cyclical 
perturbations taking place. In this connection, schemes like 
the Argentine Sustainability Guarantee Fund could be very 
useful should they have clear and sound portfolio investment 
rules averting theirs becoming an additional revenue source 
for governments᾽ public spending.   
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